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Abstract 
	
Because	of	the	ubiquity	of	evil,	religious	systems,	which	aim	to	influence	the	way	we	live	our	
lives,	must	answer	three	questions:	what	is	evil,	why	does	evil	exist,	and	how	can	we	eliminate,	
or	at	least	manage,	evil?	Call	this	the	broad	problem	of	evil,	as	opposed	to	the	traditional	
narrow	problem	of	evil.	I	reconstruct	the	answer	to	the	broad	problem	of	evil	found	in	Josiah	
Royce’s	later	writings	in	the	second	section	of	this	paper.	Then,	I	explain	why	traditional	
theodicies	are	deficient	answers	to	the	narrow	problem	of	evil.	I	argue	that	Royce’s	answer	to	
the	broad	problem	of	evil	merits	a	response	from	philosophers	in	the	Abrahamic	traditions	
because,	while	it	is	theistic—and	even	teleological—in	nature,	it	does	not	presuppose	the	
Abrahamic	conception	of	God,	nor	does	it	suffer	from	the	deficiencies	of	traditional	theodicies.	
	
	
No Soft Doctrine: Royce on the Problem of Evil 
	
	
I.	Introduction	
The	problem	of	evil	presents	one	of	the	most	serious	challenges	to	the	Abrahamic	
conception	of	God.	The	problem	arises	when	two	statements	are	conjoined:	(1)	if	God	exists,	
God	is	omniscient,	omnipotent,	and	omnibenevolent,	and	(2)	evil	exists.	If	God	is	omniscient,	
then	God	must	know	if	evil	exists.	If	God	is	omnipotent,	then	God	has	the	power	and	ability	to	
eliminate	that	evil,	given	the	desire	to	do	so.	And	finally,	if	God	is	omnibenevolent,	then	God	
must	desire	to	eliminate	evil,	or,	at	the	very	least,	all	unnecessary	evils.	Yet,	evil	exists.	This	
seems	to	imply	that	God	either	does	not	have	the	three	traditional	attributes	as	defined	or	does	
not	exist.2	Call	this	the	narrow	problem	of	evil.	
However,	evil—henceforth	denoting	undesirable	states	of	affairs—affects	everyone,	no	
matter	their	religious	beliefs.	Since	evil	is	a	major	aspect	of	the	human	experience,	religious	
systems	must	shoulder	the	theoretical	burden	of	explaining	it.	Three	major	questions	stand	out:																																																									
1.	Michael	Tooley,	"The	Problem	of	Evil,"	in	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Summer	2015	
Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta,	ed.	accessed	July	16,	2015,	http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/evil/,	
Introduction.	
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what	is	evil,	why	does	evil	exist,	and	how	we	can	eliminate	(or	at	least	manage)	evil?	All	
religious	systems	should	provide	answers	to	these	questions,	which	may	collectively	be	termed	
the	broad	problem	of	evil,	whether	or	not	they	presuppose	the	Abrahamic	conception	of	God.3	
One	system	that	answers	these	questions	persuasively	and	does	not	presuppose	the	Abrahamic	
conception	of	God	is	the	philosophy	of	religion	proposed	by	Josiah	Royce	(1855-1916).	4		
In	the	next	section,	I	reconstruct	the	answer	to	the	broad	problem	of	evil	that	Josiah	
Royce	offers	in	his	later	writings.5	In	the	third	section,	I	outline	two	traditional	theodicies6	and	
argue	that	they	are	deficient	responses	to	the	narrow	problem	of	evil,	drawing	inspiration	from	
Royce’s	mid-career	essay	“The	Problem	of	Job.”	I	then	argue	that	philosophers	in	the	
Abrahamic	traditions	should	address	Royce’s	answer	to	the	broad	problem	of	evil	because	it	
seriously	challenges	the	status	quo	in	Western	philosophy	of	religion.	First,	it	does	not	
presuppose	the	traditional	conception	of	God,	while	remaining	theistic.	Second,	while	it	does	
not	suffer	from	the	deficiencies	of	some	traditional	theodicies	which	try	to	justify	God’s	
decision	to	create	a	world	with	evil,	it	still	provides	a	teleological	account	of	the	existence	and	
resolution	of	evil.	
	
II.	Royce’s	Answer	to	the	Broad	Problem	of	Evil	
I	mentioned	that	Royce	does	not	presuppose	the	traditional	conception	of	God	and	that	
this	has	major	implications	for	his	answer	to	the	problem	of	evil.7	We	will	discuss	Royce’s	
conception	of	God	toward	the	end	of	this	section,	after	laying	the	foundation	of	Royce’s	views	
on	evil.	Royce	understands	evil	in	the	typical	sense	but	with	a	pragmatic	twist.	According	to	
Royce,	“evil”	denotes	any	undesirable	state	of	affairs	which	serves	to	undermine	the	purposes	
of	a	rational	agent.8	We	can	also	derive	a	definition	for	moral	evil	from	this:	any	undesirable	
state	of	affairs	caused	by	an	agent’s	willful	action	or	inaction	which	serves	to	undermine	the	
purposes	of	a	rational	agent.	Royce’s	commitment	to	pragmatism	complements,	rather	than																																																									
3.	Philosophers	who	attempt	to	answer	the	narrow	problem	of	evil	will	find	themselves	answering	the	
broad	problem	along	the	way,	though	they	may	simply	take	the	answers	to	the	“management”	question	for	
granted	from	the	particular	tradition	they	are	working	in.	For	example,	a	Christian	philosopher	who	proposes	a	
soul-making	theodicy	will	certainly	define	evil	and	say	why	it	exists	(i.e.,	to	facilitate	the	soul-making	process).	That	
same	philosopher	may	then	implicitly	or	explicitly	defer	to	the	Bible	for	its	teachings	on	coping	with	evil.		
4.	I	will	not	speculate	as	to	whether	or	not	Royce’s	conception	of	God	can	be	considered	a	non-traditional,	
but	still	Christian	conception	of	God,	though	Royce	seems	to	indicate	that	he	thinks	this	is	the	case.	
5.	For	the	reconstruction	of	Royce’s	answer,	I	limit	my	inquiry	to	The	Sources	of	Religious	Insight	(1912)	
and	The	Problem	of	Christianity	(1913).		
6.	See	Tooley,	Section	4.	A	theodicy	is	an	attempt	to	give	a	reason	why	God	(traditionally	construed)	might	
allow	evil	to	exist,	and	how	God	could	remain	omnibenevolent	in	doing	so.	This	is	in	contrast	to	a	total	refutation—
an	attempt	to	prove	that	the	existence	of	evil	does	not	offer	even	prima	facie	ground	to	argue	for	the	non-
existence	of	God.	Also,	a	full	explication	of	the	distinction	between	a	communal	understanding	of	the	problem	of	
evil	and	an	individualistic	one	would	be	much	toso	long	for	the	present	work.	Instead,	this	discussion	will	focus	on	
the	first	novel	feature	of	Royce’s	answer:	the	non-traditional	conception	of	God.	
7.	Jacquelyn	Ann	K.	Kegley,	Josiah	Royce	in	Focus,	(Bloomington,	Ind.:	Indiana	University	Press,	2008),	80.	
8.	Josiah	Royce,	The	Sources	of	Religious	Insight,	(Washington	D.C.:	Catholic	University	of	America	Press,	
2001),	216.		
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conflicts	with,	the	standard	definition	of	evil	since	God	is	a	rational	agent	and	acts	of	moral	evil	
ostensibly	undermine	God’s	will	in	the	world	(or	at	least,	God’s	intentions	for	the	world).	
Royce	does	not	defend	the	Abrahamic	conception	of	God	from	the	narrow	problem	of	evil.	Still,	
he	agrees	with	traditional	monotheists	that	people	exist	in	a	fallen	state,	fall	short	of	a	definite,	
ideal	life,	and	need	a	savior	to	achieve	that	life.9	However,	on	Royce’s	view,	people	are	not	evil	
by	nature.	They	perform	evil	actions	because	they	are	morally-detached	individuals.	In	other	
words,	each	individual	has	interests,	goals,	and	desires	which	can	objectively	conflict	with	those	
of	others.10	If	left	unrecognized	and	unattended,	moral	detachment	leads	people	to	ignore	the	
needs	of	others	and	to	take	so	much	pride	in	their	own	strivings	that	they	fail	to	see	the	value	in	
other’s	conflicting	strivings.11	Royce	calls	this	unhappy	state	“social	blindness.”	12	In	order	to	
find	the	cure	for	the	affliction	of	social	blindness,	we	must	investigate	the	origin	of	the	morally-
detached	individual.	
People	are	morally	individuated	in	three	ways:	by	the	distinctness	of	their	experience,	
the	outward	inaccessibility	of	their	thoughts	and	intentions,	and	by	the	presumption	that	
“deeds	and	their	doers	stand	in	one-one	correspondence,”13	or,	in	other	words,	people	
presume	that	collective	action	is	merely	the	sum	of	individuals’	actions.	Royce	argues	that	this	
last	idea	is	of	recent	vintage	and	is	not	supported	by	experience	in	daily	life.14	On	his	view,	a	
community	is	a	superhuman	being	that	is	composed	of,	but	not	reducible	to,	its	members.	By	
extension,	that	being’s	actions	are	more	than	the	sum	of	its	members’	actions.15	Members	of	a	
community	overcome	their	moral-detachedness	by	uniting	in	the	“spirit”	of	their	community.	
That	is,	by	taking	up	shared	values	and	purposes	and	acting	in	the	world	together	as	one.	These	
Roycean	communities	come	in	various	sizes	and	persuasions,	so	we	have	plenty	of	candidates	
to	choose	from	for	an	illustration.	A	hypothetical	youth	soccer	league	will	do	nicely.	
Imagine	that,	some	years	ago,	a	group	of	parents	decided	that	the	local	neighborhood	
children	should	have	more	opportunities	to	play	together	and	get	to	know	each	other.	They	
pitched	in	to	buy	a	vacant	field	and	soccer	equipment	and	started	holding	games	every	
weekend.	Those	parents	formed	a	community	by	acting	together	for	the	sake	of	a	shared	
purpose.	Each	member	now	considers	the	past	actions	of	the	league	as	events	that	belong	to	
their	own	past,	and	the	future	actions	of	the	league	as	part	of	their	own	future.	For	example,	
Bill	and	Sarah	both	remember	painting	the	lines	on	the	field	before	the	very	first	game,	and	
look	forward	to	the	day	when	the	league	can	afford	a	scoreboard.	Like	an	individual	person,	a	
community	acts	in	the	world	presently,	has	a	past,	and	will	have	a	future.	The	sum	of	all	those	
shared	and	anticipated	experiences—and	the	meanings	those	events	hold	for	the	members—																																																								
9.	Ibid.,	28-29.	
10.	Josiah	Royce,	The	Problem	of	Christianity,	(Washington	D.C.:	Catholic	University	of	America	Press,	
2001),	194.	
11.	Kegley,	Josiah	Royce	in	Focus,	93.	
12.	Royce,	Problem	of	Christianity,	378.	
13.	Ibid.,	238.	
14.	Ibid.,	240.	
15.	Ibid.,	123.	
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constitute	the	“self”	of	the	community.16	Yet,	not	every	community	has	the	same	peaceful	
existence	as	our	hypothetical	soccer	league.	Often,	the	purposes	of	a	community	are	subverted	
by—or	existentially	opposed	to—instances	of	evil,	and	members	must	thwart	that	evil.	Royce	
calls	people’s	practical	devotion	to	a	higher	communal	life—including	struggling	together	
against	evil—	“loyalty,”17	and	it	is	to	that	concept	that	we	turn	now.	
Recall	that	an	instance	of	evil	is	any	undesirable	state	of	affairs	that	undermines	the	
purposes	of	a	rational	agent.	Under	this	heading,	we	would	do	well	to	include	pain,	disease,	and	
pestilence.	Finite	beings	can	only	survive	within	a	very	narrow	range	of	acceptable	conditions	
and	are	severely	limited	in	their	abilities	to	maintain	those	conditions.	Since	human	beings	are	
limited	in	their	individual	experience	and	knowledge	of	the	world,	they	form	communities	to	
survive.	As	a	matter	of	course,	those	communities	create	and	follow	moral	codes	that	vary	
widely.	This	means	that	the	practices	of	one	community	are	often	considered	evil	by	another.	
How	can	we	reconcile	competing	and	diametrically	opposed	loyalties	that	are	equally	moral	on	
their	own	terms?	And	how	can	we	do	so	without	embracing	relativism?	Toward	this	end,	we	
will	need	a	regulative	principle:	a	principle	which	is	logically	prior	to	the	moral	code	of	any	
particular	community,	but	that	every	community	can	act	upon.	Furthermore,	no	community	
should	have	reasoned	grounds	to	reject	our	sought-for	principle,	no	matter	how	fiercely	they	
might	oppose	any	other	particular	community.	
That	principle	is	this:	recognize	“the	spiritual	unity	of	all	the	world	of	reasonable	beings”	
as	the	true	cause	of	loyalty.	18	Then,	seek	to	actualize	that	unity	through	the	particular	causes	
that	make	up	one’s	communal	life.	It	is	necessary	and	honorable	to	devote	oneself	to	one’s	
community,	but	it	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	one’s	community	contributes	to	the	overall	
growth	of	loyalty.	Communities	that	are	rooted	in	hating	and	destroying	other	communities	are	
not	objects	of	genuine	loyalty.	Those	communities	retard	or	reverse	the	overall	growth	of	
loyalty,	because	they	exist	solely	to	divide	people	from	one	another.	They	explicitly	undermine	
the	true	cause	of	loyalty,	which,	as	we	will	see,	is	divine	in	nature.	On	the	contrary,	so	long	as	a	
person	is	loyal,	and	that	loyalty	is	not	given	to	a	hateful	cause,	that	person	is	doing	their	moral	
and	spiritual	duty.19	At	this	point,	it	would	be	tempting	to	infer	that	the	highest	moral	life	is	a	
single-minded	campaign	to	rid	the	world	of	evil.	Yet,	Royce’s	keenest	insight	into	the	
experience	of	evil	is	that	this	is	blatantly	false.	
So	far,	we	have	been	treating	evil	as	something	that	simply	should	not	exist.	That	seems	
intuitive.	After	all,	curing	100%	of	malaria	cases	is	necessarily	better	than	curing	99%	of	malaria	
																																																								
16.	See	Chapter	2	of	Kegley’s	Josiah	Royce	in	Focus	for	a	thorough	explication	of	Royce’s	views	on	the	self.	
17.	Royce,	Problem	of	Christianity,	269.	See	also:	Frank	Oppenheim,	Royce’s	Mature	Philosophy	of	Religion,	
(Notre	Dame,	Ind.:	Notre	Dame	Press,	1987),	142.	“Higher	life”	here	is	meant	in	two	senses.	First,	in	the	sense	that	
devotion	enriches	a	person’s	life,	and,	second,	in	the	sense	that	the	person’s	life	becomes	more	attuned	to	the	
divine	life.	
18.	Royce,	Sources	of	Religious	Insight,	205.	Emphasis	removed	from	the	original.	
19.	More	precisely,	that	person	is	doing	their	moral	and	spiritual	duty	as	well	as	a	finite	being	can.	On	
Royce’s	view,	no	finite	being	can	fully	live	up	to	the	demands	of	morality.	See	Dwayne	A.	Tunstall,	“Royce’s	Ethical	
Insight:	Its	Relevance	for	Today”,	Paper	presented	at	Josiah	Royce:	Pragmatist,	Philosopher	of	Religion,	Ethicist,	
Hamburg,	Germany,	October	2,	2015.	
Brandon	Wright	 	 No	Soft	Doctrine	 	
	 27	
cases.20	Still,	on	Royce’s	view	there	truly	are	experiences	of	evil	that	no	one	would	wish	to	
remove	from	their	lives.21	
Whether	they	occur	through	conscious	separation	or	accidental	death,	the	evils	that	
often	cause	the	most	psychological,	emotional,	and	spiritual	damage	are	the	losses	of	loved	
ones.22	Supposing	that	one	can	forgive	an	unfaithful	spouse	or	a	friend-turned-enemy,	that	
person’s	betrayal	can	never	be	forgotten.	Even	so,	that	grief	is	not	something	we	would	want	to	
dispose	of	entirely.	One	might	wish	to	numb	oneself	to	the	pain	if	it	is	unbearable,	but	not	to	
the	sensitivity	or	connection	that	causes	the	pain.	For	example,	a	person	may	wish	to	no	longer	
grieve	a	departed	loved	one,	but	that	person	would	certainly	not	wish	to	lose	all	the	memories	
of	their	loved	one,	nor	would	they	hope	to	never	love	another	person	again.	Spiritual	strength	
is	acquired	by	recognizing	and	retaining	social	sensitivity	through	the	grieving	process	and	using	
it	to	deepen	relations	with	others.23	The	result	of	that	struggle	is	sorrow.	
In	order	to	recognize	the	strength	that	sorrow	offers,	we	must	take	a	step	back	from	the	
pain	of	grief	and	recognize	why	it	exists.	A	severed	tie	between	intimately	connected	people	
gives	rise	to	the	worst	imaginable	pain.	This	implies	that	humans	are	profoundly	social	beings	
who	have	the	capacity	to	intimately	connect	with	others.	Sorrow’s	unsettling	prevalence	
presents	a	religious	insight:	spiritual	strength	is	not	won	by	merely	avoiding	possible	suffering	
because,	in	this	world,	everyone	will	have	sorrows.	Neither	one’s	world	nor	one’s	fellows	are	
perfect.	Individuals	gain	spiritual	strength	by	developing	the	patience	and	courage	to	face	a	
future	full	of	meaningful	relations	without	bitterness	or	resentment.	
With	this	in	mind,	the	next	step	is	to	endure	the	hardship.	Finally,	it	is	necessary	to	draw	
upon	the	insight	of	sorrow	and	reinvest	oneself	in	the	social	reality.	One	must	deepen	
relationships	or	form	new	ones	while	remaining	aware	that	sorrow	in	the	future	is	
guaranteed.24	There	is	no	pain-free	way	to	restore	balance	to	life,	but	life	can	become	much	
more	meaningful	in	the	process.	By	spinning	grief	into	sorrow,	one	can	enjoy	new	and	renewed	
loyalties—the	dedication	to	vital	communities	and	causes	that	enrich	one’s	life.	However,	this	
solemn	work	becomes	especially	difficult	when	one’s	grief	is	caused	by	betrayal.	
When	a	person	betrays	their	community,	they	set	off	a	grieving	process	which	is	often	
fatal	for	the	community.	The	losses	incurred	by	the	betrayal	are	permanent	because	the	
betrayer	cannot	undo	the	destructive	deed.	As	much	as	the	betrayer	may	wish	they	could	turn	
back	time,	punishment	only	reminds	them	that	their	deed	is	irrevocable.	Moreover,	the	
community’s	memory	of	the	evil	deed	scars	any	remaining	affection	or	sympathy	that	the	
community	can	extend	to	the	betrayer.	However,	as	traumatic	as	it	is,	the	aftermath	of	a	
betrayal	is	fertile	ground	for	the	creative	power	of	communal	action.	Members	who	are	willing																																																									
20.	Assuming,	of	course,	that	eliminating	the	remainder	did	not	involve	doing	anything	terribly	imprudent.	
21.	Royce,	Sources	of	Religious	Insight,	239.	
22.	These	cases	of	personal	loss	may	be	categorized	as	either	moral	or	non-moral	evils.	An	elderly	
grandmother	dying	in	her	sleep	is	obviously	not	committing	a	moral	evil,	since	the	grandmother	did	not	choose	to	
devastate	her	family.	However,	if	that	same	grandmother	was	intentionally	given	a	fatal	dose	of	medication	by	a	
twisted	attendant,	her	death	would	be	an	instance	of	moral	evil.		
23.	Royce,	Sources	of	Religious	Insight,	252.	
24.	Ibid.,	253.	
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to	bear	the	sorrow	of	betrayal	and	work	to	reestablish	their	community	bring	about	goods	that	
would	have	been	impossible	had	the	betrayal	not	taken	place,	by	manifesting	the	spirit	of	their	
community.	25	To	illustrate	this	point,	we	need	to	outline	the	process	of	atonement.	
In	the	Problem	of	Christianity,	Royce	illustrates	his	idea	of	atonement	through	an	interpretation	
of	the	Biblical	story	of	Joseph.26	Joseph’s	brothers	sold	him	into	slavery	because	they	were	
jealous	of	the	preferential	treatment	he	received	from	their	father.	Years	later	during	a	time	of	
great	famine	Joseph’s	brothers	travelled	to	Egypt,	where	Joseph	served	as	Pharaoh’s	trusted	
advisor,	to	buy	supplies.	Joseph	revealed	his	identity	to	his	brothers	and	sent	them	back	to	their	
father	with	ample	provisions.	On	Royce’s	view,	when	Joseph	provided	for	his	family	he	was	
engaged	in	a	creative	reversal	of	his	brothers’	betrayal	or,	in	other	words,	an	act	of	atonement.	
There	are	three	central	elements	to	such	acts	of	atonement.	The	first	is	that	the	act	is	
performed	by	some	person	other	than	the	betrayer.	The	second	is	that	the	act	is	made	possible	
by	the	specific	betrayal	for	which	it	atones.	The	third	element	is	that	the	act	of	atonement	
makes	the	world	better	than	it	was	before	the	betrayal.27	In	this	case,	Joseph	could	not	have	
helped	his	brothers	if	he	were	not	sold	as	a	slave.	Joseph	chose	to	see	through	his	grief,	endure	
it,	and	make	it	part	of	a	process	of	reconciliation.	Coincidence	may	have	brought	them	together	
spatially,	but	only	Joseph’s	actions	could	have	reunited	the	family	spiritually.	Now	that	the	
foundation	of	Royce’s	views	has	been	laid,	we	can	make	the	divine	thread	running	through	the	
discussion	explicit.	
Recall	that,	for	Royce,	a	community	is	a	superhuman	being.	As	such,	communities	can	
be	afflicted	by	a	kind	of	social	blindness	like	the	one	that	we	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	the	
section.	When	members	set	out	to	do	things	on	behalf	of	their	community,	they	are	expressing	
love	for	one	another	and	for	that	being	that	unites	them:	the	spirit	of	their	community.28	
However,	the	love	for	a	community	can,	itself,	become	a	stumbling	block	on	the	path	toward	
creating	more	inclusive	communities.	I	do	not	need	to	regale	the	reader	with	horrific	stories	
from	our	species’	past.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	people	are	in	constant	danger	of	allowing	the	love	
they	have	for	their	community	to	become	obsessive	and	exclusionary.29	When	members	refuse	
to	recognize	the	value	of	external	communities,	their	own	communities	stagnate,	ossify,	or	turn	
malignant.	This	is	social	blindness	scaled	up	to	the	communal	level.	The	members	mistake	their	
finite,	fallible	community	for	the	highest	human	good	and	do	not	seek	to	actualize	any	higher	
community.	On	the	contrary,	Royce’s	view	is	that	the	greatest	good	is	the	struggle	to	actualize	
the	highest	community,	i.e.,	the	Universal	Community.		
The	Universal	Community	is	precisely	that	“spiritual	unity	of	all	the	world	of	reasonable	
beings”	mentioned	above.	30		Finite	communities	and	their	members	work	toward	actualizing	
this	ideal	by	guarding	against	encroaching	blindness	and	remaining	inclusive,	uplifting,	and																																																									
25.	Royce,	Problem	of	Christianity,	180.	
26.	Ibid.	204.	
27.	Ibid.	180.	
28.	Ibid.	265.	
29.	Kegley,	Josiah	Royce	in	Focus,	93.	
30.	Royce,	Sources	of	Religious	Insight,	205.	Emphasis	removed	from	the	original.	
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faithful	to	the	Spirit	of	the	Universal	Community,	which	guides	the	community-building	process.	
The	Spirit	of	the	Universal	Community,	which	is	Royce’s	quasi-analogue	to	the	Abrahamic	God,	
is	the	divine	being	who	calls	upon	individuals	to	conquer	evil	by	exercising	their	loyal	devotion	
to	communities—especially	through	atoning	deeds—and	calls	upon	communities	to	seek	
common	ground	and	solidarity	with	each	other.		
The	community-building	process	is	also	the	“evil-overcoming”	process	because	
community-building	harmonizes	the	wills	of	rational	beings	and	unites	them	under	common	
causes.	This	means	that	all	individuals	and	communities	are	tasked	with	the	temporal,	yet	
endless,	process	of	overcoming	evil.	The	task	is	temporal	because	it	takes	place	within	the	
processes	of	the	world	as	the	Spirit	overcomes	evil	step	by	step	through	the	triumphs	of	its	
members.	The	task	is	endless	because,	while	individuals	can	work	toward	actualizing	the	ideal	
of	the	Universal	Community,	they	will	necessarily	fail.	As	long	as	there	are	finite	beings	there	
will	be	inhospitable	conditions	and	conflict.31	Even	in	principle,	we	cannot	atone	for	every	
instance	of	evil.	However,	those	who	act	toward	that	ideal	state	of	atonement,	and	strive	to	
bring	lasting	peace	to	this	fallen	world,	take	up	the	Spirit’s	cause	as	their	own,	and	thereby	find	
their	place	in	the	divine	life.32		
Readers	who	are	familiar	with	the	argument	from	evil	and	the	typical	rebuttals	it	draws	
will	wonder	what	Royce’s	answer	has	to	offer	to	the	discussion.	In	the	next	section	I	will	offer	a	
preliminary	answer	to	that	question.	
	
III.	Two	Traditional	Answers	to	the	Problem	of	Evil	
In	this	section	I	will	argue	that	Royce’s	answer	to	the	problem	of	evil	has	distinct	
advantages	over	two	traditional	theodicies	because	it	does	not	presuppose	the	traditional	
conception	of	God.	To	make	the	advantages	explicit,	however,	we	will	need	to	acquaint	
ourselves	with	those	two	traditional	theodicies:	soul-making	and	free	will.	
	 Soul-making	theodicies	presume	that	human	spiritual	development,	culminating	in	the	
achievement	of	a	spiritual	ideal	ordained	by	God,	is	supremely	valuable.	In	fact,	they	presume	
that	God	created	human	beings	for	the	express	purpose	of	attaining	that	ideal	and	earning	the	
right	to	dwell	with	God.33	That	being	said,	spiritual	development	comes	at	a	price.	People	must	
endure	evil	in	order	to	acquire	the	character	traits	necessary	to	develop	according	to	God’s	
plan.	Since	God	created	a	world	where	people	can	develop	through	their	struggles	with	evil	
and—at	least	potentially—achieve	the	spiritual	ideal	set	out	for	them,	God	remains	morally	
perfect.	With	this	understanding,	the	existence	of	God	is	consistent	with	the	existence	of	evil.	
Now	we	move	to	free	will	theodicies.	
	 	Free	will	theodicies	presume	that	libertarian	free	will,	when	it	is	used	to	worship	God	
and	when	it	is	in	accordance	with	God’s	moral	dictates,	is	supremely	valuable.	These	theodices																																																									
31.	Indeed,	there	could	be	no	finite	beings	at	all	without	there	also	being	some	conditions	which	
undermine	their	existence.	
32.	Royce,	Problem	of	Christianity,	186.	
33.	René	Van	Woudenberg,	“Chapter	12:	A	Brief	History	of	Theodicy,”	in	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	the	
Problem	of	Evil,	ed.	Justin	P.	McBrayer	and	Daniel	Howard-Snyder	(Somerset,	NJ.:	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	Incorporated	
2013),	177.		
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posit	that	God	created	people	with	free	will	so	that	they	could	worship	and	act	morally	of	their	
own	accord.34	Although	people	may	misuse	their	free	will	and	act	immorally,	the	great	value	of	
its	proper	use	more	than	justifies	the	existence	of	evil.	Therefore,	God	must	have	created	
people	with	free	will	in	order	to	create	a	morally	perfect	world	and	the	existence	of	God	is	not	
inconsistent	with	the	existence	of	evil.	
Royce	would	argue	that	on	both	views,	God	is	responsible	for	the	existence	of	
unnecessary	evils.35	An	all-loving	God	who	is	responsible	for	necessary	evils	can	remain	all-
loving,	but	a	God	who	allows	unnecessary	evils	to	transpire	cannot	be	considered	all-loving.	
Therefore,	the	theodicies	are	inadequate	answers	to	the	narrow	problem	of	evil.	
To	delineate	these	unnecessary	evils,	we	will	begin	with	the	soul-making	account.	On	this	view,	
God	is	responsible	for	the	suffering	required	by	the	developmental	process	as	it	exists	now.	It	
may	very	well	be	the	case	that	persons	develop	spiritually	by	struggling	with	evil	and	eventually	
earn	the	right	to	dwell	with	God.	But	if	that	is	the	case,	it	is	only	so	because	God	designed	the	
world	in	such	a	way	that	suffering	is	necessary	for	spiritual	growth.	All	other	things	being	equal,	
a	world	where	people	do	not	have	to	suffer	to	acquire	godly	character	traits	is	better	than	one	
in	which	they	must.	Any	attempt	to	justify	the	soul-making	process	by	appealing	to	the	goods	
afforded	by	that	process	fails	because	
	
[T]alk	of	medicinal	and	disciplinary	evil,	perfectly	fair	when	applied	to	our	poor	fate-
bound	human	surgeons,	judges,	jailors,	or	teachers,	becomes	cruelly,	even	cynically	
trivial	when	applied	to	explain	the	ways	of	a	God	who	is	to	choose,	not	only	the	physical	
means	to	an	end,	but	the	very	Physis	itself	in	which	path	and	goal	are	to	exist	together.36	
	
Being	omnipotent,	God	could	have	just	as	easily	designed	a	soul-making	process	that	did	not	
involve	the	experience	of	suffering	but	chose	not	to	do	so.	Now,	we	consider	the	free	will	
account.		
If	someone	watched	a	man	stumble	out	of	a	bar,	fumble	with	his	keys,	and	proceed	to	
drive	away	clearly	intoxicated,	we	would	hold	that	person	accountable	for	not	intervening	if	
they	were	able	to	do	so.	Of	course,	an	omniscient,	omnipresent,	and	omnipotent	God	is	
perfectly	able	to	intervene	whenever,	wherever,	and	in	whatever	fashion	that	God	desires.	So	
even	if	the	value	of	free	will	is	granted,	God	could	ensure	that	innocent	people	do	not	die	when	
drunk	people	take	the	wheel.	Driving	under	the	influence	need	not	cause	anyone	but	the	driver	
and,	perhaps	his	willing	riders,	to	suffer.	Yet,	there	are	many	innocent	victims	every	year.	The	
theodicies	propose	that	God	tests	the	innocent	by	letting	them	suffer	at	the	hands	of	the	guilty	
and	purifies	their	souls	through	pain.	Those	are	not	expressions	of	omnibenevolence.	Because	
of	this,	neither	a	free	will	theodicy	nor	a	soul-making	theodicy	can	rescue	the	traditional	
conception	of	God	from	the	narrow	problem	of	evil.	
																																																								
34.	Van	Woudenberg,	“Brief	History	of	Theodicy”,	185.		
35.	Josiah	Royce,	“The	Problem	of	Job”,	in	Studies	in	Good	and	Evil,	(New	York:	D.	Appleton	and	Company,	
1898).	See	also:	Kegley,	Josiah	Royce	in	Focus,	79-80.	
36.	Royce,	“The	Problem	of	Job”,	9.	
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Unlike	the	traditional	conception	of	God,	the	Spirit	of	the	Universal	Community	does	not	
create	the	world,	but	expresses	itself	through	the	existing	processes	of	the	world.37	This	means	
that	the	Spirit	cannot	conceivably	bear	responsibility	for	the	existence	of	evil.	Furthermore,	
while	the	traditional	God	allows	evil	to	exist	to	suit	its	own	salvific	tastes,	the	entire	aim	of	the	
Spirit	is	to	overcome	evil	by	bringing	finite	beings	together	in	community.		
A	full	comparison	of	Royce’s	answer	to	the	traditional	answers	will	have	to	wait	for	
another	work.	However,	I	have	shown	in	this	work	that	Royce’s	answer	is	in	no	way	deflationary	
or	dismissive	of	the	problem	of	evil,	so	long	as	the	problem	is	properly	understood.	Royce	does	
not	concede	that	“evil”	is,	say,	a	non-cognitivist	ascription	in	the	way	some	philosophers	have	
tried	to	argue	that	“murder	is	wrong”	can	translate	to	“boo	murder!”	Nor	is	evil	reducible	to	a	
naturalistic	truism	such	as	“evil	is	whatever	homo	sapiens	do	not	prefer	in	their	environments	
or	condone	in	the	behavior	of	their	fellows.”	Royce	provides	a	teleological	answer	to	the	
problem	of	evil	that	has	clear	advantages	over	traditional	theodicies,	but	which	does	not	suffer	
from	the	attendant	difficulties	of	those	theodicies.	His	answer	merits	scholarly	attention	
because	it	poses	a	serious	challenge	to	the	Abrahamic	status	quo	in	the	philosophy	of	religion.	
	
IV.	Conclusion	
	 In	this	paper,	I	introduced	the	narrow	problem	of	evil	and	Josiah	Royce’s	answer	to	the	
broad	problem	of	evil.	After	I	reconstructed	Royce’s	answer,	I	gave	some	preliminary	reasoning	
as	to	why	two	traditional	answers	to	the	narrow	problem	of	evil	fail.	Then	I	showed	that	
Royce’s	conception	of	God	does	not	face	even	a	prima	facie	existential	threat	from	the	
existence	of	evil,	and	its	sole	mission	is	to	bring	about	the	resolution	of	evil	by	bringing	finite	
beings	into	community.	Thus,	Royce’s	answer	is	theistic	and	teleological,	but	it	does	not	suffer	
from	the	deficiencies	found	in	some	traditional	answers	to	the	problem	of	evil.	For	these	
reasons,	and	the	fact	that	answers	to	the	narrow	problem	of	evil	are	fraught	with	difficulties,	I	
argue	that	Royce’s	answer	to	the	broad	problem	of	evil	merits	a	response	from	philosophers	of	
religion	in	the	Abrahamic	traditions.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 																																																								
36.	See	Kegley,	Josiah	Royce	in	Focus,	157-8.	For	a	brief	summary	of	Royce’s	views	on	the	monotheistic	
doctrine	of	creation.	
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